Energy Corridors Through Türkiye: Pipelines, Gas Hubs and the Eastern Mediterranean Question

Why It Matters

Oil and gas reach Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East through Türkiye along several east–west and north–south routes, and the country wants to turn that transit role into a trading hub. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the same geography collides with unresolved maritime boundaries and the unsettled Cyprus question, so the issue is shaped as much by law and diplomacy as by engineering.

This guide separates three layers: the pipelines that exist today, the 'energy hub' concept in Turkish official statements, and the Eastern Mediterranean dispute over offshore hydrocarbons. It presents the positions of Greece, the Greek Cypriot administration, Egypt, Israel and the EU from their own official sources, followed by Türkiye's stated position. For the wider logistics picture, see The Crossroads Guide.

Background

How oil and gas cross Türkiye today

Türkiye produces little oil and gas compared with its consumption, so its strategic weight comes from location. It borders the Caspian-linked South Caucasus, Iran, Iraq and Syria, and it adjoins the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The table lists the principal routes. Figures are design or contracted capacities as commonly published by the operators and governments involved; actual flows vary by year, and readers should check current operator data before relying on them.

Route	Type	Path	Reference facts
Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC)	Crude oil	Azerbaijan – Georgia – Türkiye (Ceyhan terminal, Mediterranean)	About 1,768 km; operating since 2006; designed for about 1 million barrels per day; bypasses the Turkish Straits
Kirkuk–Ceyhan	Crude oil	Iraq – Türkiye (Ceyhan)	Dates to the 1970s; flows were halted in March 2023 after an ICC arbitration ruling; its status has since been subject to Baghdad–Erbil–Ankara arrangements
South Caucasus Pipeline (Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum)	Natural gas	Azerbaijan – Georgia – Türkiye	Carries Shah Deniz gas; deliveries to Türkiye began in 2007
TANAP	Natural gas	Georgian border to Greek border (Edirne)	About 1,850 km; inaugurated in 2018; Europe deliveries began in 2019; initial capacity 16 bcm/year (about 6 bcm for Türkiye, 10 bcm for Europe)
TAP	Natural gas	Greece – Albania – Adriatic – Italy	Continues TANAP into Southern Europe; about 10 bcm/year initial capacity; operating since 2020
Blue Stream	Natural gas	Russia – Black Sea – Türkiye (Samsun)	Operating since 2003; about 16 bcm/year
TurkStream	Natural gas	Russia – Black Sea – Türkiye (Kıyıköy)	Two lines of 15.75 bcm/year each; one serves Türkiye, one serves Southern and Southeastern Europe; inaugurated in January 2020
Iran–Türkiye (Tabriz–Ankara)	Natural gas	Iran – Türkiye	Operating since 2001; long-term contract runs to 2026

(bcm = billion cubic metres. 1 bcm is roughly 35.3 billion cubic feet.)

The east–west axis (Caspian to Europe via BTC, the South Caucasus Pipeline, TANAP and TAP) is closely tied to the Middle Corridor and the Trans-Caspian route. The north–south axis (Russia and Iran in, Europe and Turkish consumers out) is more exposed to sanctions and price politics. Iraqi crude passes through the southern frontier corridor, where security conditions directly affect energy flows.

A further reason for Ceyhan's importance is maritime. Oil exported there does not add to tanker traffic in the Istanbul and Çanakkale Straits, which are governed by the 1936 Montreux Convention; see Freedom of Passage Under Montreux.

The 'energy hub' concept

Turkish officials use 'energy hub' in a broader sense than 'transit country'. A transit country carries molecules for a fee. A hub also trades, stores, blends, prices and re-exports them. In October 2022, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly floated the idea of a gas trading hub in Türkiye's Thrace region, and Turkish energy officials have repeated the aim since then. Several assets underpin the idea:

• Pipeline density: the routes above, plus interconnectors with Greece and Bulgaria.
• LNG capacity: floating storage and regasification units and onshore terminals, giving Türkiye access to global LNG as well as pipeline gas.
• Domestic production: the Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea, whose first gas reached the national grid in April 2023; official reserve estimates have been announced and revised several times, so treat any single number with caution.
• State trading actor: BOTAŞ, the state energy company, which signs supply and re-sale contracts.

For a sister-publication overview of the same concept, see Doctrine Review's guide to Türkiye as an energy hub. Independent analysts question how far a hub can develop without liquid, transparent pricing and open third-party access. That is a market-design debate that does not depend on any political position.

The Eastern Mediterranean: from discoveries to disputes

The region's modern gas story begins with discoveries off Egypt, Israel and Cyprus. The sequence below is limited to dated, verifiable events.

• 2003: Egypt and the Republic of Cyprus sign an EEZ delimitation agreement. Türkiye objects that it overlaps its continental shelf.
• 2004: Türkiye begins notifying the UN of its Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates. The same year, the Greek Cypriot administration enacts its EEZ law and is admitted to the EU on 1 May 2004.
• 2007 and 2010: Cyprus signs EEZ agreements with Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010).
• 2009 and 2012: The TRNC grants TPAO (Türkiye's state petroleum company) exploration licences, according to Turkish official accounts.
• 19 September 2011: Greek Cypriot-authorised drilling starts in Block 12.
• 21 September 2011: Türkiye and the TRNC sign a Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement.
• 2015: Eni announces the Zohr discovery off Egypt, which became the cornerstone of Egypt's LNG recovery.
• January 2019 and September 2020: Egypt hosts the creation of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) and the signing of its charter. Türkiye is not a member.
• 27 November 2019: Türkiye and Libya's Tripoli-based government sign a maritime jurisdiction memorandum of understanding.
• 2 January 2020: Greece, Cyprus and Israel sign an intergovernmental agreement for the EastMed pipeline (about 1,900 km, around 10 bcm/year as designed).
• 18 March 2020: Türkiye registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN.
• August 2020: Greece and Egypt sign a partial EEZ delimitation. A standoff over seismic survey activity in the Aegean and Mediterranean follows.
• January 2022: Media report that Washington has told the parties it no longer supports EastMed as a priority project, citing economics and climate considerations.
• June 2022: The EU, Egypt and Israel sign a memorandum on natural gas exports to Europe via Egyptian LNG facilities.
• 16 April and 12 June 2025: Türkiye unveils its Marine Spatial Planning and records it with IOC-UNESCO.

The maritime-boundary side of this story is explained in Sea Lanes and Seabed Lines and in the sister analysis Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Turkish drilling fleet

Türkiye operates its own deep-water drilling vessels (Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni and Abdülhamid Han) and seismic survey ships including Oruç Reis and Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa. Turkish official accounts count eight major Eastern Mediterranean wells: Alanya-1, Finike-1, Karpaz-1, Güzelyurt-1, Mağusa-1, Narlıkuyu-1, Lefkoşa-1 and Selçuklu-1. No commercially producing field in the Mediterranean has been announced from these wells, so the fleet's significance is mainly legal and political: it is the way Ankara exercises, and signals, its claimed rights.

Energy transition and COP31

Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement in October 2021 and announced a 2053 net-zero target. It is due to host COP31 in Antalya in November 2026, under an arrangement agreed at COP30 in which Türkiye hosts and holds the COP presidency while Australia leads the negotiations. Turkish officials link the summit to the Zero Waste initiative and to a broader climate-diplomacy agenda.

There is a visible tension that analysts discuss openly. A gas-hub strategy and new fossil gas production sit alongside renewable expansion and a 2025 Climate Law that provides for a national emissions trading system. Turkish officials generally describe gas as a transition fuel and a supply-security tool, and argue that a larger role for Türkiye in gas trading can lower costs for consumers in Europe. Critics, including climate researchers and environmental groups, warn about lock-in of long-lived infrastructure. Both arguments are publicly stated, and this guide does not resolve them. What matters for readers is that the energy corridor debate and the COP31 agenda will increasingly be discussed together.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece ratified UNCLOS in 1995 and holds that islands generate full continental shelf and EEZ entitlements under Article 121, with the only legitimate dispute being the delimitation of those zones, ideally referred to the International Court of Justice. Athens calls the 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum legally void because it disregards the Greek island of Crete and others. Greece and Türkiye have eased tensions since the Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations of December 2023, but the substantive maritime positions have not changed.

The Greek Cypriot administration (Republic of Cyprus)

The Greek Cypriot administration, internationally recognised as the Republic of Cyprus, states that it holds sovereign rights over an EEZ declared in 2004 and delimited with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel. It has licensed blocks to international companies such as ExxonMobil, Eni and TotalEnergies and has announced discoveries including Aphrodite, Calypso, Glaucus and Cronos. On revenue, it has said that hydrocarbon proceeds will benefit all Cypriots and that Turkish Cypriots will share in them in the context of a settlement. In July 2019, President Nicos Anastasiades proposed a mechanism under which revenues would be placed in a fund pending a settlement. Turkish Cypriot and Turkish officials did not accept that mechanism, arguing it did not recognise equal co-ownership.

Egypt

Egypt's petroleum and foreign ministries emphasise Egypt's role as a regional LNG hub, with liquefaction at Idku and Damietta, and treat the EMGF as the main cooperation framework. Egypt rejects the Türkiye–Libya memorandum as lacking legal effect and has relied on its 2003 agreement with Cyprus and its 2020 partial agreement with Greece. Cairo and Ankara have normalised relations since 2023, and Turkish officials have said that a Türkiye–Egypt delimitation could be negotiated; no agreement exists.

Israel

Israel's Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure promotes exports from Tamar and Leviathan to Egypt and Jordan, and views the EMGF and the 2022 EU–Egypt–Israel memorandum as its main route to European buyers. Its 2010 EEZ agreement with Cyprus is the legal basis for its northern boundary on that side. Proposals for an Israel–Türkiye pipeline have been discussed periodically by commentators and officials, but there is no agreement, and political relations have been strained since the Gaza war.

The European Union

European Council conclusions have repeatedly expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus and called Turkish drilling activity in Cypriot-claimed waters unauthorised. In November 2019 the Council established a framework for restrictive measures related to Türkiye's drilling, and in February 2020 it listed two TPAO officials. At the same time, EU institutions state that Türkiye remains a key partner in energy supply, and the EU has an interest in diversifying away from Russian gas, which is why the Southern Gas Corridor through Türkiye matters in Brussels.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

The points below summarise Ankara's official positions as stated by Turkish institutions. They are Türkiye's assessments, not neutral findings.

• Energy hub and balanced supply. Ankara argues that Türkiye is a natural bridge between producers and consumers, and that its pipeline network (BTC, TANAP, TurkStream, Blue Stream and others) contributes to Europe's supply security. This framing appears in the Presidency's and the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources' public statements and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' energy policy pages. Ankara adds that any regional gas export scheme that bypasses Türkiye is economically weaker than one that includes it.
• Equity-based delimitation. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean must be settled on the principle of equity, taking into account coastal geography and proportionality. Türkiye has the longest mainland coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean (about 870 km). It argues that islands close to a mainland coast cannot cut off that coast's maritime projection. Ankara cites international jurisprudence that has reduced or denied the effect of small islands, for example the 1977 Anglo-French Court of Arbitration (half effect for the Scilly Isles) and the ICJ's 2009 Black Sea judgment (Romania v. Ukraine), where Serpents' Island had no effect on the boundary. Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and relies on customary international law.
• Equal rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish official statements hold that Turkish Cypriots are co-founders and equal co-owners of the island under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the Zurich–London framework, and therefore have inherent rights over offshore resources. Ankara and the TRNC argue that the Greek Cypriot administration cannot license blocks on behalf of the whole island. They point to the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement and the TPAO licences granted in 2009 and 2012. They also argue that UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) wrongly treated the Greek Cypriot administration as the sole government of Cyprus.
• Constructive offers remain open. The TRNC put forward hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue-sharing proposals in 2011, 2012 and 2019, generally involving a joint committee and shared decisions, and President Erdoğan proposed an Eastern Mediterranean Conference in 2020 that would include all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots. Türkiye says that no energy or security arrangement that excludes Türkiye and the TRNC can be lasting, and it objects to EEZ agreements concluded without them, including the 2003 Cyprus–Egypt agreement (whose Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Ankara says overlap its continental shelf), and the 2007 and 2010 agreements with Lebanon and Israel.
• Legal registration. Ankara points to its UN-notified continental shelf coordinates (from 2004), its 18 March 2020 registration of outer limits, and its Marine Spatial Planning (announced on 16 April 2025 and recorded with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025), as well as the Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025 establishing an inter-agency coordination board under the Foreign Ministry. Ankara also rejects the maximalist 'Seville Map'; see Regional Balance's explainer and the sister fact check on UNCLOS.

On the related question of whether Türkiye blocks cables or pipelines, see Fact Check: Does Türkiye Block Undersea Cables and Pipelines in the Eastern Mediterranean?. For the Cyprus settlement background, see Crossing the Green Line.

Source Comparison

The table shows how the same issues are framed by different sources. It describes framing and does not rule on the legal merits.

Issue	Common Greek, Greek Cypriot and EU framing	Turkish official framing	What can be checked
Legal basis of maritime zones	UNCLOS, islands have full entitlements, Cyprus has a declared EEZ	Customary law and equity; Türkiye is not a UNCLOS party; islands cannot cut off mainland projection	Türkiye has not signed UNCLOS; ICJ and arbitral cases have varied island effects
Who may license offshore blocks	The Republic of Cyprus as the internationally recognised state	Both co-owners of the island; Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights	The Republic of Cyprus has licensed blocks since 2007 and the TRNC has licensed TPAO since 2009
Revenue sharing	Turkish Cypriots share after a settlement; 2019 fund proposal	Joint committee and revenue sharing now; 2011, 2012 and 2019 TRNC proposals	No joint mechanism has been agreed
Türkiye's drilling	Unauthorised activity in Cypriot waters; EU restrictive measures in 2019–2020	Exercise of sovereign rights on Türkiye's own shelf and on behalf of the TRNC	The framework and two listings are documented in the EU Official Journal
EastMed pipeline	Strategic diversification project	Economically weaker without Türkiye, which offers a shorter route	Intergovernmental agreement signed in 2020; US support reportedly withdrawn in 2022
Türkiye's role as hub	Transit state; concerns about dependence on Russian and Iranian gas	Reliable bridge between suppliers and markets; pricing hub ambition	TANAP, TurkStream, BTC and Blue Stream operate; a liquid trading hub is not yet established

Two points deserve emphasis. First, claims about the commercial superiority of one route over another are best checked against independent studies and operators' data rather than the statements of any party. Second, many sources use the terms 'Cyprus' and 'Republic of Cyprus' interchangeably, while Turkish sources use 'Greek Cypriot administration' and 'TRNC / Turkish Cypriots'. Readers should keep in mind who is being described when they compare texts. For another sister-publication reading of the maritime-map argument, see The Worldlogue's fact check on the Seville Map.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Energy hub: a location that trades, stores and prices energy, not only a transit point.
• bcm: billion cubic metres, the usual unit for annual gas flows.
• EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone): a zone of up to 200 nautical miles (about 370 km) in which a coastal state has sovereign rights over resources, under UNCLOS and customary law.
• Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coast; rights over it exist inherently under international law.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): the Turkish doctrine of maritime jurisdiction in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.
• TPAO / BOTAŞ: Türkiye's state petroleum exploration company and its state gas and pipeline company, respectively.
• EMGF: East Mediterranean Gas Forum, a Cairo-based regional organisation that does not include Türkiye or the TRNC.
• COP31: the 2026 UN climate conference, to be hosted in Antalya.

Related reading on this site: Recorridor home, The Crossroads Guide, What Is the Development Road Project Linking Iraq to Türkiye?, About Recorridor and Editorial Principles.

By the Recorridor Editorial Team. Recorridor presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.